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EFFECT OF UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS ON THE 
OFFSHORE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE PROGRAM 
 
Steven Ferraro* 
 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP) allows 
taxpayers who are delinquent in the filing of Reports of Foreign Bank 
and Financial Accounts (FBAR) and corresponding unreported taxable 
income the opportunity to be compliant. An FBAR is a disclosure form 
that requires taxpayers holding foreign accounts aggregating over 
$10,000 to submit financial information to the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) annually. After joining the OVDP, taxpayers file eight years of 
back tax returns and FBARs. By doing so, taxpayers become responsible 
for paying the back tax liability, plus interest, and related accuracy 
penalties.1 In consideration for voluntary compliance, the IRS alleviates 
all generally asserted penalties surrounding delinquent FBARs (FBAR 
Penalties), and replaces them with a single 27.5% penalty on the highest 
aggregate amount in the foreign financial accounts over the past eight 
years (Offshore Penalty).2 Additionally, the IRS agrees not to 
recommend taxpayer disclosure to the Department of Justice for criminal 
prosecution.3 
The success of the OVDP is widely accepted. As of November 2012, 
the IRS collected $5 billion through the current OVDP and its previous 
iterations, funds which otherwise would evade taxation in the United 
States.4 Additionally, by bringing over 34,500 taxpayers into compliance, 
the IRS saves future taxable dollars from escaping collection.5 Most 
significantly, the IRS collects valuable information on previously 
undisclosed foreign accounts aiding international tax enforcement 
efforts.6 In exchange for these benefits, the IRS merely replaces the 
potentially high FBAR penalties for the generally lower 27.5% Offshore 
Penalty. Without the OVDP, the IRS would likely not know which 
delinquent accounts to charge the FBAR Penalties. 
                                                
* Associate, Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., (Admitted in New Jersey). The author appreciates the 
valuable comments on earlier drafts of this Article provided by Professor Steven Dean. 
1 IRS, Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program: Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, 
http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program-
Frequently-Asked-Questions-and-Answers (last visited June 26, 2012) [hereinafter FAQ]. 
2 Id. at 7. 
3 Id. at 3. 
4 IRS NEWS RELEASE IR-2012-64 (JUNE 26, 2012). 
5 Id. 
6 FAQ, supra note 1, at 1. 
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Initial critics of the OVDP pointed to its one size fits all approach 
toward delinquent taxpayers.7 Under the OVDP’s guidelines, all 
taxpayers are charged a 27.5% Offshore Penalty, regardless of how 
willful or fraudulent they were in neglecting to file their FBAR. This is 
unlike FBAR Penalties, which vary by the level of willfulness. 
Incidentally, in certain situations where a taxpayer nonwillfully violates 
the FBAR reporting requirement, that taxpayer would pay a lower 
penalty if caught outside the OVDP than if she entered the OVDP, and 
paid the 27.5% Offshore Penalty. Given the likelihood of escaping an 
audit, the OVDP incentivized nonwillful taxpayers to avoid the program. 
To alleviate this problem the IRS devised an opt out feature that 
allows nonwillful taxpayers to enter the OVDP and come into 
compliance without facing steep penalties. Rather than accepting the 
27.5% Offshore Penalty, taxpayers face a full examination and are 
subject to FBAR penalties. One factor in determining the size of the 
FBAR penalty is the willfulness of the FBAR Reporting Requirement 
violation. The penalty for a willful violation of the FBAR Reporting 
Requirement is significantly more draconian than the penalty for a 
nonwillful violation. Thus, the standard for determining whether a 
violation is willful, the Civil Willfulness Standard, is a factor for a 
taxpayer to consider when determining whether to voluntarily disclose, 
because it determines both the expected liability of opting out and the 
expected liability of the FBAR penalties if caught outside the OVDP. 
Tax practitioners are beginning to reexamine the Civil Willfulness 
Standard after the recent Fourth Circuit case United States v. 
Williams.8 In Williams, the court broke away from its more lenient 
interpretation of the Civil Willfulness Standard, and moved toward a 
stricter liability standard.9 Although the court declined to offer a bright 
line rule, it devoted almost all of its opinion to whether or not a taxpayer 
checked “No” on Question 7 of Schedule B, Part III of the taxpayer’s 
Form 1040 (Question 7a).10 Question 7a asks whether a taxpayer held a 
foreign account, and guides the taxpayer to check the FBAR instructions. 
Based on that evidence (nearly exclusively), the court found Mr. 
Williams in willful violation through willful blindness.11  
Williams may have significant impact on certain taxpayers in relation 
to the OVDP. With the IRS potentially finding more delinquent 
taxpayers willful, and thus subject to a higher FBAR Penalty, it becomes 
more expensive to stay out of the OVDP. If taxpayers do enter the 
OVDP, the opt out procedure may be less appealing. For a relatively 
blameless taxpayer who, pre-Williams, would have likely been found 
nonwillful, there is a possibility that the best decision for that taxpayer is 
to enter the OVDP, and not opt out. These changes have two effects. 
                                                
7 See Thomas Zehnle, Rethinking the Approach to Voluntary Disclosures, TAX NOTES TODAY, 
Jan. 31, 2012 at 577, available at 2012 TNT 20-3. 
8 United States v. Williams, 489 F. App’x 655 (4th Cir. 2012). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
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First, as previously explained, it can dramatically affect a delinquent 
taxpayer’s decisions to enter the OVDP. Second, these changes also 
affect the equity of the OVDP by practically removing the opt out for 
many taxpayers, thus reviving the one size fits all approach of initial 
concern. 
This paper proposes a new solution for the OVDP in the wake of 
Williams. The IRS should keep the incentives provided for taxpayers to 
enter the OVDP, but also provide for equitable justice. This article bases 
its structure on a proposal by the National Taxpayer Advocate, Nina 
Olson, and features an incorporated version of the opt out system, which 
codifies three distinct penalty tracks for taxpayers. This solution 
maintains administrative ease, encourages disclosure, and promotes 
equity in treatment. 
Part II will review the success of the OVDP. First, it will provide an 
overview of the OVDP, including its history, and significant features. 
Secondly, the Part will analyze what features gave the OVDP success. 
Part III will analyze the changing civil willfulness standard. First, it will 
analyze the status of the civil willfulness standard, and how it was 
potentially changed by the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Williams. Second, 
the Part will consider how the changing willfulness standard might affect 
the OVDP. Finally, Part IV will detail the solution to amend the OVDP 
in light of Williams. 
 
II. SUCCESS OF THE OVDP 
 
A. Overview of the OVDP 
 
The need for the OVDP arose from a growing concern about 
undisclosed wealth held by U.S. citizens in foreign countries. The Tax 
Justice Network estimates that wealth to be between $21 trillion and $32 
trillion, which equates to between $190 billion and $280 billion of lost 
annual tax revenue.12 With the U.S. Federal Budget deficit approaching 
$1.1 trillion for fiscal year 2012, the tax revenue currently escaping the 
IRS would reduce the deficit by approximately 25%.13 Considering the 
looming actions Congress may take to cut entitlements, and raise revenue 
from compliant taxpayers, policymakers must address this concern. 
In addition to the historic budget shortfall, income inequality is near 
an all time high.14 Pressure is mounting to encourage the government to 
stand up for low, and middle income taxpayers, who use foreign 
undisclosed accounts less frequently, by cracking down on wealthy 
individuals who continue to obtain unfair tax advantages by hiding 
                                                
12 Revealed: global super-rich has at least $21 trillion hidden in secret tax havens, TAX 
JUSTICE NETWORK (July 22, 2012), http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/The_Price_of_ 
Offshore_Revisited_Presser_120722.pdf. 
13 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN UPDATE TO THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL 
YEARS 2012 TO 2022 (2012). 
14 LINDA LEVINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE US INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND MOBILITY: 
TRENDS AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS, R42400 (2012). 
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wealth overseas. Compelling disclosure of foreign held assets while 
preserving administrative resources would aid our country’s fiscal health, 
and begin to mend income inequality.15 
Based on the dual concerns of raising revenue and protecting fairness, 
the IRS formally established a special voluntary disclosure program in 
2009 (Program), similar to the current OVDP.16 This new Program, 
considered alongside the IRS’s pursuit of John Doe Summons on foreign 
UBS clients,17 increased examinations of FBAR fillings, and is part of a 
concentrated effort to solve the issue of undisclosed foreign wealth.18 
The Program allowed the IRS to assess an Offshore Penalty of 20% after 
receiving full disclosure from the delinquent taxpayer.19 The 20% 
Offshore Penalty was often substantially lower than the FBAR Penalties 
assessed by the IRS outside the Program. The Program was successful. It 
accepted 18,000 applications and, as of January 2012, the IRS collected 
$3.4 billion with 5% of its claims still pending.20 
Because delinquent taxpayers showed interest in making further 
disclosures,21 the IRS announced a follow up Program in 2011, the 
Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative (OVDI).22 The most significant 
difference from the previous Program was an increase in the Offshore 
Penalty, from 20% to 25%.23 The OVDI was also successful as it brought 
in an additional 12,000 submissions.24 
                                                
15 Even Congress has noted the need for a formal program. In 2008, just months before the 
establishment of the OVDP, Senator Baucus noted that "[I]t's clear from today's testimony that we 
have an opportunity—indeed a duty—to find legislative solutions to pressure the IRS and better 
enable them to collect on the nearly $345 billion annually of legally-owed but unpaid taxes.”  Sen. 
Max Baucus, Baucus Says Congress Has a ‘Duty’ to Ameliorate Offshore Tax Evasion, TAX NOTES 
TODAY, July 25, 2008, available at 2008 TNT 144-29. 
16 The IRS has had a long-standing practice of voluntary disclosure, but has never established a 
formal policy, except for a brief period in 2003. See FAQ, supra note 1, at 3. 
17 In August 2009, the IRS, the Swiss government, and UBS came to an agreement that sent 
United States client data from almost all the sources sought in the John Doe summonses to the IRS. 
The purpose of this agreement was to reveal identities of taxpayers with foreign accounts to the 
United States government. On November 17, 2009, the IRS estimated that the agreement would 
produce 4,450 foreign accounts subject to an IRS investigation. Between 2001 and 2008, only bank 
accounts worth more than $989,000 were subject to disclosure. David D. Stewart, IRS Releases UBS 
Agreement Criteria, Results of Voluntary Disclosure Initiative, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 18, 2009, 
available at 125 Tax Notes 832. 
18 Between 2004 and 2009, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration found 
penalties from examinations of FBARs increased 388% to $20,500,000, and penalties collected 
increased from $1,800,000 to $9,800,000. Increases in Examinations, Penalties Commensurate with 
Rise in FBAR Reporting, TIGTA Says, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 29, 2010, available at 2010 TNT 
227-4. Furthermore, the IRS increased staffing, doubling the overseas offices of the Criminal 
Investigations in 2010. The IRS now has offices in Beijing, Hong Kong, and Panama. Amy S. 
Elliott, IRS Increases Staffing For Next Round of Offshore Enforcement, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 
15, 2010, available at 129 Tax Notes 775. 
19 Steven T. Miller, Memorandum from Deputy Comm’r for Serv. and Enforcement, Opt Out 
and Removal Guide for 2009 OVDP and 2011 OVDI (June 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/2011_ovdi_opt_out_and_removal_guide_and_memo_june_1_201
1.pdf at 18. 
20 IRS News Release IR 2012-5 (Jan. 9, 2012) [hereinafter $4.4 billion]; IRS News Release IR 
2010-122 (Dec. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Prepared Remarks]. 
21 IRS News Release IR 2011-14 (Feb. 8, 2011). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 IRS News Release IR 2011-94 (Sept. 15, 2011). 
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In 2012, the IRS established the OVDP, which unlike the first two 
editions would remain active indefinitely.25 The IRS cited the “continued 
strong interest from taxpayers and tax practitioners” for continuing this 
Program.26 The Offshore Penalty increased once again from 25% to 
27.5%.27 As of June 2012, the Program brought an additional 1,500 
voluntary disclosures.28 The combined efforts of the three Programs 
surpassed $5 billion in penalties, and back taxes. 29 
To participate in the OVDP 30 the delinquent taxpayer must disclose 
all of her foreign held assets which aggregate over $10,000 and were not 
previously reported on FBARs.31 Additionally, taxpayers must file all 
delinquent FBARs for the previous eight years,32 and complete an 
“Offshore Letter,” which requires procedural information regarding the 
taxpayer’s foreign account.33 For any account with an aggregate value 
above $500,000 the taxpayer must provide bank statements to 
substantiate the financial information.34 
In addition to disclosure, taxpayers must also pay and calculate all 
past due tax liability on income earned, and not reported from the 
undisclosed accounts.35 Thus, taxpayers must submit their original U.S. 
tax returns, along with their new amended U.S. tax returns, for all years 
covered by the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure.36 The taxpayer must pay 
all applicable interest, and a 20% accuracy related penalty.37 
In return for agreeing to voluntarily disclose accounts, and pay back 
taxes and interest, the IRS allows the delinquent taxpayer to pay an 
                                                
25 $4.4 billion, supra note 20. 
26 Id. 
27 FAQ, supra note 1, at 7. 
28 IRS News Release IR 2012-64 (June 26, 2012). 
29 Id. 
30 The taxpayer’s process: to ensure that the taxpayer is eligible for the OVDP, the taxpayer 
may submit her name, social security number, and other vital information to the IRS for pre-
clearance. The goal of pre-clearance is to ensure that only eligible taxpayers send information to the 
IRS. Upon passage from the pre-clearance department, the taxpayer must send an offshore letter to 
the criminal investigations department. The criminal division will issue a preliminary acceptance to 
the OVDP. Within ninety days of acceptance, the taxpayer must furnish the remaining required 
information for a civil examination, including past due tax liabilities. There is no thorough 
examination in this process. The civil examiner will ensure the completeness and correctness of the 
submission, and accompanying paperwork, but will not follow an audit-like procedure. The IRS will 
issue a Form 906 “Closing Agreement” which outlines the proposed Offshore Penalty. If the 
taxpayer wishes to pay, she signs the closing agreement, and sends in the final Offshore Payment. 
See FAQ, supra note 1, at 7. 
31 The OVDP is specifically for taxpayers who have unreported tax liability income. The 
OVDP is not for those who forgot to report assets that did not produce income. Additionally, the 
OVDP is specifically for those people currently not under investigation by the IRS. See FAQ, supra 
note 1, at 17. 
32 Id. at 7. For calendar year taxpayers the voluntary disclosure period is the most recent eight 
tax years for which the due date has already passed. The eight-year period does not include current 
years for which there has not yet been noncompliance. The IRS is allowed to look back for eight 
years if the taxpayer signs the relevant forms (the regular statute of limitations is only three years). 
To facilitate the extended inquiry, the IRS requires signed forms to enter the OVDP. 
33 Some of the information requested includes the estimated amount in each account, estimated 
income from the accounts, financial institution, and contact information of the financial institution. 
34 Id. at 25. 
35 Id. at 7. 
36 Id. 
37 26 U.S.C. § 6662(a). 
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Offshore Penalty in lieu of all FBAR Penalties. For many taxpayers the 
Offshore Penalty is much less than the FBAR Penalties; for others, 
however, it is not. The IRS lacks any authority to alter the Offshore 
Penalty.38 Furthermore, there is no appeals process after completion of 
the OVDP.39 
 
B. Why the OVDP Worked 
 
The OVDP has been extremely successful. To understand, or 
criticize, the effect of the OVDP, the four goals of the Program must be 
considered: raising revenue, bringing individual disclosing taxpayers into 
compliance, assisting in further prosecutions, and reducing 
administrative costs. 
The first goal of the OVDP is to raise revenue. As indicated, the 
budget deficit and U.S. government debt is growing unsustainably large 
and may cause fiscal problems that threaten the United States in the not 
so distant future. Given the staggering amount of wealth remaining 
abroad, the IRS may combat the deficit by raising revenue through this 
program. In this light, the collection of $5.5 billion, which otherwise 
would still be abroad, is a great success. On the other hand, $5.5 billion 
is only a fraction of potential tax revenue that could be collected from the 
approximate $32 trillion held abroad by U.S. citizens.40 The Program has 
failed to bring in a majority of foreign undisclosed wealth. However, 
without this program, $5.5 billion would remain abroad. 
The second goal of the OVDP is to bring individual taxpayers who 
disclose permanently into compliance.41 The IRS accomplishes this goal 
by requiring taxpayers in the Program to disclose account information by 
filing delinquent FBARs and an Offshore Letter. The benefit to the IRS, 
as explained by former IRS Commissioner Doug Schulman (Schulman), 
is that these taxpayers will now “properly report and pay their taxes for 
years to come.”42 The OVDP encourages all taxpayers to “come in 
through the front door,” and hopefully continue to be compliant and pay 
taxes in the future.43 The IRS seems to have accomplished this goal, as 
38,000 taxpayers have entered compliance. However, others might 
disagree, as that reflects only a small handful of delinquent taxpayers. 
Nevertheless, because of this Program 38,000 taxpayers are now 
compliant. 
The third goal of the OVDP is to assist in further prosecutions. Each 
voluntary disclosure submission contains information on the foreign 
                                                
38 FAQ, supra note 1, at 50. 
39 Id. at 49. 
40 David Leigh, Leaks reveal secrets of the rich who hide cash offshore, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 
3, 2013) http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/apr/03/offshore-secrets-offshore-tax-haven. 
41 The IRS describes the OVDP’s primary goal as “to bring taxpayers that have used 
undisclosed foreign accounts, and undisclosed foreign entities to avoid or evade tax into compliance 
with United States tax laws.” Id. at 2. 
42 Prepared Remarks, supra note 20. 
43 Marie Sapirie, Consistency is Focus of OVDI, Official Says, TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar. 21, 
2011, available at 2011 TNT 54-4. 
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account and financial institution. The IRS has been mining existing 
information to identify the actors and institutions assisting U.S. taxpayers 
in hiding offshore accounts. The IRS plans to use this information to 
prosecute delinquent taxpayers in accordance with their power to issue 
John Doe Summons, and it relies on the threat of further summonses to 
encourage other taxpayers to disclose. In furtherance of this goal, 
Schulman said, “With both preparers and the IRS stepping up their 
efforts in the area, a ‘hide-in-the-sand’ approach to reporting offshore 
accounts and income has become a much riskier calculus for US 
taxpayers holding assets anywhere around the world.”44 This goal is the 
most difficult to assess. Disclosure has decreased each year, an indication 
that this Program may be losing momentum. It is possible that delinquent 
taxpayers who value compliance with U.S. tax law have already 
disclosed. The threat of foreign tax enforcement is growing, however, as 
are the number of prosecutions. It may be best to revisit this goal after 
the IRS has had the chance to develop their use of the information. 
The final goal of the OVDP is to keep administrative costs low. The 
IRS chose to take a one size fits all approach, greatly reducing the 
amount of administrative resources needed for each disclosure. The 
OVDP enables the IRS to centralize the criminal and civil processing of 
voluntary disclosures and to resolve a large number of the cases without 
formal (and costly) examination.45 This goal has been a success. 
Underlying each of the four main policy goals is the OVDP’s ability 
to incentivize taxpayers to voluntarily disclose. If it fails to bring in 
taxpayers, the IRS would not achieve any of its goals. Therefore, before 
discussing any changes to the OVDP, it is important to understand why 
taxpayers would want to enter the OVDP. The five factors taxpayers 
consider whether to enter the OVDP are: potential of being caught 
outside the OVDP, penalty framework inside the OVDP, personal utility 
placed on compliance with the U.S. tax law, certainty of timing and 
amount of taxation; and criminal FBAR avoidance. 
The first factor influencing the taxpayer’s decision is the greater risk 
of being caught violating the FBAR Reporting Requirement outside the 
OVDP. During the last four years, the IRS has engaged in a variety of 
enforcement programs to find delinquent taxpayers hiding offshore 
accounts. These programs include tax treaties, whistleblower laws, and 
the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).46 Nondisclosing 
taxpayers are now much less confident that their identity will remain 
unknown to the IRS. Although the IRS is still less likely to catch 
taxpayers outside the OVDP, the tide is changing and taxpayers have 
more incentive than ever before to enter into compliance. 
The role of audits is very important in evaluating this factor. 
Although the overall audit rate is about 3% for individual taxpayers, that 
                                                
44 Shulman Discusses Progress on IRS’s International Tax Agenda, Multiyear Tax Compliance 
Strategy, TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 10, 2009, available at 2009 TNT 236-15. 
45 FAQ, supra note 1, at 1. 
46 Id. at 4. 
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does not paint the appropriate picture. The percentage of audits in which 
the IRS agent found an error was approximately 30% among individuals. 
Therefore, taxpayers should not feel comforted by the 3% audit figure. 
The second factor encouraging taxpayers to enter the OVDP is the 
special penalty framework. Taxpayers place varying degrees of 
importance on this factor depending on the size and amount of their 
accounts, and whether they violated the FBAR Reporting Requirement 
“willfully” or “nonwillfully.” A taxpayer who violates the FBAR 
Reporting Requirement willfully will likely face a lower overall penalty 
by entering the OVDP as opposed to opting out. However, for taxpayers 
who violate the FBAR Reporting Requirement nonwillfully, the offshore 
penalty is less beneficial than being caught outside the OVDP. For those 
taxpayers, the opt out is essentially neutralized, as they will pay the same 
penalty being caught outside of the OVDP as by entering it and opting 
out. 
Third, potentially the most significant factor for some taxpayers is the 
utility they derive from being compliant with the U.S. tax laws.47 When 
analyzing a taxpayer’s decision to enter the OVDP, it would be easy to 
consider only quantitative factors. However, some taxpayers who 
discover that they have been violating the FBAR Reporting Requirement 
may want to enter the OVDP to be compliant. This may be true even if 
“quantitatively” they would be better off not entering the OVDP. Many 
honest taxpayers likely find a high level of utility by following the law. 
However, taxpayers who intentionally violate the FBAR Reporting 
Requirements likely find less utility in compliance with tax law than 
other taxpayers. 
The fourth factor is the value taxpayers place on the certainty the 
OVDP provides. The OVDP allows taxpayers to obtain certainty in two 
areas: the timing of the penalty, and the amount of the penalty. The 
certainty of the amount of the penalty is important because it allows 
taxpayers to plan for the loss they will face. Taxpayers who live and rely 
on the undisclosed money will be more sensitive to this factor. The 
certainty of timing factor is important because it allows taxpayers to 
prepare to make their payments. Taxpayers who opt out do not get either 
benefit. As one tax practitioner asks, "What is the cost of being able to 
sleep at night?" 48 
The concept of risk aversion explains this factor. Risk aversion is the 
behavioral economic concept whereby, given two equal levels of 
expected tax liabilities, the taxpayer would prefer the option with the 
least amount of variability. This happens because taxpayers value 
certainty. Economic literature has indicated that people are more risk 
averse when the losses are potentially high. Alternatively, people tend to 
favor risk more when it involves a potentially high gain. Therefore, as 
                                                
47 Utility is a concept in economics that encompasses an individual’s preferences. For example, 
someone who enjoys baseball would likely derive a high level of utility from watching a no-hitter. 
This would be more powerful with a citation. 
48 Lee Sheppard, New Analysis: How Do United States Holders of Swiss Accounts Come 
Clean?, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 25, 2008, available at 2008 TNT 188-5. 
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the IRS pursues more aggressive enforcement policies that have the 
effect of increasing the expected tax liability facing delinquent taxpayers, 
the taxpayer becomes more risk averse and, therefore, more likely to 
enter the OVDP because it provides certainty.   
Finally, an additional incentive the OVDP offers is avoidance of 
criminal charges. Taxpayers who acted willfully in their violation of the 
FBAR Reporting Requirement, may be subject to criminal penalties.49 
Entering the OVDP will shield this delinquent taxpayer, as the IRS will 
not recommend the taxpayer to the criminal division. However, if a 
taxpayer opts out, the IRS may pursue criminal prosecution.50 Taxpayers 
who are not in danger of criminal prosecution will not consider this a 
significant factor. 
Even if the OVDP meets all of its goals, the IRS should not view it as 
a success unless it treats all taxpayers equitably.51 Initially, a major 
problem with the OVDP was that it treated all taxpayers the same, 
regardless of the reason they failed to disclose their foreign accounts. For 
example, some practitioners complained that there existed a major 
difference between those taxpayers who inherited accounts from their 
parents and never withdrew money to the United States, and those 
taxpayers that deliberately set up foreign accounts to dodge domestic 
taxation.52 To address the issue of equity, the IRS added programs that 
lowered the Offshore Penalty to 5% or 12.5%, based on certain taxpayer 
qualifications. 53 However, those programs only deal with a limited 
number of taxpayers and do not address the problem at large.   
The most important provision addressing equity concerns is the opt 
out. This provision allows taxpayers to enter the OVDP instead of taking 
the 27.5% Offshore Penalty and face an examination and argue that they 
acted nonwillfully. Taxpayers will only use the opt out provision if they 
would face a lower expected penalty under an examination than through 
the Offshore Penalty. Thus, taxpayers who violated the FBAR 
requirement willfully can pay the 27.5% Offshore Penalty, but those who 
acted without willful intent can opt out, and pay the smaller FBAR 
penalties. 
The penalty framework is just one factor that influences taxpayers. 
Taxpayers also consider the expected probability of the IRS catching 
them outside the Program. In addition, many taxpayers who are 
nonwillful value compliance with the U.S. law. Finally, some taxpayers 
                                                
49 E.g., 26 U.S.C. 7201 (2013) (tax evasion); 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (2013) (filing a false return); 
26 U.S.C. § 7203 (2013) (failure to file an income tax return); 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (2013) (willfully 
failing to file an FBAR); 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (2013) (willfully filling a false FBAR). Note that when 
the case is clearly nonwillful, there is no chance for a criminal violation. Thus, in those situations, 
this factor is not as important. 
50 FAQ, supra note 1, at 51. 
51 It is important to note that this paper does not consider the horizontal equity between 
taxpayers who violate different law. If the IRS pursues an OVDP for offshore evaders, is it equitable 
to not give a similar program to those who are evading domestic corporate tax who want to enter 
compliance?  It seems that if this program is successful, others might follow in its steps. 
52 Randall Jackson, Audit Might Be Best Choice For United States Taxpayers in Voluntary 
Disclosure Program, TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 8, 2010, available at 2010 TNT 68-1. 
53 FAQ, supra note 1, at 53. 
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prefer the certainty of knowing when they will have to make the 
payment. Thus, even though some taxpayers may not be better off 
quantitatively, other taxpayers will find it advantageous to enter the 
OVDP, and then opt out. 
Consider an example of two fictional taxpayers’ and their decision to 
enter the OVDP. Ms. Francis Bar (Ms. Bar) inherited four foreign 
accounts from wealthy overseas relatives, and used them for storing 
money in Europe to pay for travel expenses; the monies never left the 
foreign country and she does not live off the funds. The accounts earn 
very little income, as Ms. Bar held them in basic low interest and low 
risk savings accounts. She pays all foreign tax in a tax heavy jurisdiction. 
When she speaks to her domestic accountant annually, Ms. Bar does not 
disclose these accounts (nor does she report them or the corresponding 
foreign tax credits), as she is not aware that foreign accounts are relevant 
for U.S. income tax. Ms. Bar signed her Form 1040 and checked, “No” 
on Question 7a. Based on this information, if examined, there is a 5% 
chance that the IRS will find that she violated the FBAR regulation 
willfully. 
Mr. William Full (Mr. Full) opened four foreign accounts to deposit 
money from his purely domestic self-owned business. He does not have 
family in the foreign jurisdiction, or any other reason to visit. Mr. Full 
works on a monthly basis with his accountant, but never mentions the 
foreign money. Mr. Full tells his lawyers that he deposits his money 
internationally because he believes in the diversification of asset 
location. He lives predominantly off the foreign earnings and moves 
most of the income back to the United States. Mr. Full signed his Form 
1040 and checked “No” on Question 7a. Based on this information, and 
given that the IRS agent would be viewing only circumstantial evidence, 
there is a 50% chance that the IRS will find that he violated the FBAR 
regulation willfully, if the IRS examines him. 
Each taxpayer, Ms. Bar and Mr. Full, has an aggregate account 
balance of $12,445,000, spread over four offshore accounts ($35,000; 
$80,000; $330,000; and $12,000,000 respectively). The 27.5% Offshore 
Penalty for both Ms. Bar and Mr. Full would be $3,422,375.54   
When Mr. Full considers whether to enter the OVDP, he must know 
his expected penalty if examined outside of the OVDP. If the IRS finds 
Mr. Full to have willfully violated the FBAR Reporting Requirement, his 
FBAR Penalty would be $37,068,000.55 However, if the IRS finds him to 
have violated the FBAR Reporting Requirement nonwillfully, his penalty 
would be $171,000.56 Given that Mr. Full would be found willful 50% of 
                                                
54 $12,445,000 (aggregate account balance) × 0.275 (offshore penalty percentage) = $3,422,375 
(offshore penalty). 
55 $37,068,000 (willful penalty) = $5,000 (first account) + $8,000 (second account) + $165,000 
(third account) + $6,000,000 (fourth account) × 6 (for each year). 
56 $171,000 (nonwillful penalty) = $3,500 (first account) + $5,000 (second account) + $10,000 
(third account) + $10,000 (fourth account) × 6 (for each year). 
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the time, his expected penalty if examined outside of the OVDP would 
be $18,619,500.57 
Mr. Full will consider a variety of factors to determine whether or not 
he should enter the OVDP. First, he will consider his chances of the IRS 
catching him outside the OVDP. Mr. Full may look at whether the IRS is 
scrutinizing banks from the foreign jurisdiction and whether the foreign 
jurisdiction is entering into new tax agreements with the United States. 
Second, Mr. Full will find that entering the OVDP provides a very 
beneficial penalty framework. If he enters, he will save $15,197,175 as 
opposed to not entering the Program and being caught by the IRS. Third, 
Mr. Full will have to consider how much he values being compliant with 
tax law. Fourth, Mr. Full will have to consider how much he values the 
certainty of knowing how much he will pay and when he will pay it. 
Given that he lives off the money, this may be important for him. Finally, 
Mr. Full will have to decide whether he may be subject to criminal 
penalties. Since the IRS may find that he violated the FBAR Reporting 
Requirement willfully, this is a potential concern. Overall, this is a 
complex decision for Mr. Full, and it will depend on how heavily he 
weighs each factor. See Table 1 for a graphical summary of Mr. Full’s 
decision. 
Ms. Bar will also have a difficult decision to make. If the IRS finds 
Ms. Bar to have acted willfully, her FBAR penalties will be 
$37,068,000.58 However, if the IRS finds her to have acted nonwillfully, 
her penalty will just be $171,500.59 Given that the IRS would find her to 
be willful a projected 5% of the time, her expected penalty if examined 
outside of the OVDP is $2,015,850.60 However, her expected penalty 
outside the OVDP is lower than the Offshore Penalty. If she does enter, 
she would likely opt out, and pay an expected $2,015,850. 
Like Mr. Full, Ms. Bar will consider a variety of factors in deciding 
whether or not to disclose. First, like Mr. Full, she will consider the 
possibility of the IRS auditing her and specifically look at the IRS’s 
international efforts in the foreign jurisdiction where her accounts are 
located. Second, Ms. Bar will not consider entering the OVDP a benefit 
in terms of the penalty framework, as she pays the same amount whether 
she enters (and opts out) or the IRS catches her outside the OVDP. Third, 
there is a good chance that Ms. Bar will want to enter the OVDP because 
of the utility of being compliant; as she always acted without an intent to 
violate the law, she will want to avoid being labeled a “tax cheat.” 
Fourth, certainty is not likely to be important for her, because she does 
not live off the money. Finally, since it is unlikely that she acted 
willfully, criminal prosecution will not be a concern. Depending on how 
                                                
57 $18,619,500 (expected penalty) = willful (0.50 × $37,068,000.00) + nonwillful (0.50 × 
$171,000.00). 
58 $37,068,000 (Willful Penalty) = ($5,000 (first account) + $8,000 (second account) + 
$165,000 (third account) + $6,000,000 (fourth account)) × 6 (for each year). 
59 $171,000 (nonwillful penalty) = ($3,500 (first account) + $5,000 (second account) + $10,000 
(third account) + $10,000 (fourth account)) × 6 (for each year). 
60 $2,015,8000 (expected penalty) = willful (0.05 × $37,068,000) + nonwillful (0.95 × 
$171,000). 
WINTER 2014                                                 Effect of United States v. Williams 
 
38 
 
heavily she weighs each of these factors, she will make her decision. No 
one can predict what decision either Mr. Full or Ms. Bar would make; 
however, by understanding what each taxpayer is considering, we can 
see how a change in the OVDP would affect their decisions.  See Table 1 
for a graphical summary of Ms. Bar’s decision. 
 
Table 1. Initial Decision Matrix for Ms. Bar and Mr. Full 
 Enter the OVDP Avoid the OVDP and Risk Audit 
Ms. Bar 
(5% Willful; 
80% Nonwillful) 
Expected Penalty 
of $2,015,850 (after 
opt out); Enter 
Compliance 
Expected Penalty of 
$2,015,850 if Examined; 
Potential to Avoid Penalty 
If No Audit 
Mr. Full 
(50% Willful; 
50% Nonwillful) 
Guaranteed Penalty 
of $3,442,375; Enter 
Compliance; Avoid 
Criminal Prosecution; 
Certainty of Penalty 
Liability  
Expected Penalty of 
$18,619,500 if Examined; 
Potential to Avoid Penalty 
If No Audit 
 
Based on these two taxpayers, the goals of the OVDP are met. The 
utility of being compliant attracts a taxpayer like Ms. Bar to the OVDP. 
Likewise, the OVDP is attractive to Mr. Bar because it offers a lower 
expected tax liability, removal possible criminal penalties, and the 
certainty of the payment amount and timing. The decision for both 
taxpayers is not clear; it depends on how each taxpayer weighs the 
factors. However, the OVDPs wide range of incentives will likely 
convince many taxpayers to enter their overseas wealth. 
In terms of equity, the OVDP does an acceptable job. A taxpayer like 
Mr. Full pays a reduced penalty compared to what he would have faced 
if caught outside the OVDP. That penalty, however, is still higher than 
for a taxpayer like Ms. Bar who will opt out and pay a lower FBAR 
Penalty.   
 
III. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AFTER WILLIAMS 
 
A. The Changing Civil Willfulness Standard 
 
The decision whether or not to enter the OVDP depends on whether 
the expected FBAR Penalty faced outside of the OVDP is higher or 
lower than the Offshore Penalty faced inside.61 Thus, measurement of the 
                                                
61 Under the authority of 31 U.S.C. § 5314 (2013), enacted through the Bank Secrecy Act, the 
IRS requires taxpayers having a financial interest in or signature authority over one or more financial 
accounts held internationally, valued at a collective minimum of $10,000, to file an annual FBAR. In 
order to enforce the FBAR requirement, the IRS was given the power to assess civil penalties for 
failure to file. 31 C.F.R. § 103.56 (2013). The FBAR must be filed before June 30 of the calendar 
year after the account was recorded. Any person in the U.S., as a resident or a citizen, is subject to 
these reporting rules, and must file an FBAR. This is not limited to individuals; corporations, limited 
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FBAR penalty levies a great impact on the success of the OVDP. To 
determine the expected FBAR penalty for a specific taxpayer, the IRS 
considers three factors: the size of the account, the number of accounts, 
and the level of willfulness in committing the violation.62 The first two 
factors are rather straightforward, and cause little controversy.63 The final 
factor, level of willfulness, presents the most debate. 
The IRS and various U.S. courts have been drawing a picture of what 
they consider a willful violation. On July 20, 2012, however, the civil 
willfulness standard underwent a potentially dramatic change after the 
Fourth Circuit Court handed down United States v. Williams, which was 
the first U.S. circuit court case ruling on the standard.64 In this 
nonbinding opinion, the Appellate Court took a staunch position.  
Recently, a U.S. District Court in Utah followed a similar legal strategy 
as Williams.65 
A review of the civil willfulness standard is necessary before 
examining how it potentially changed after Williams. The IRS considers 
three distinct levels of conduct: negligence, nonwillful, and willful. The 
negligence penalty applies only to businesses, and thus, is not a focus of 
this paper.66 Regarding the latter two categories of conduct, the IRS 
levies a lower FBAR penalty on taxpayers who violate the FBAR 
requirement nonwillfully than those who did so willfully.67 A nonwillful 
violator faces a maximum penalty of $10,000 per account per year.68 The 
IRS offers the possibility of mitigation to reduce penalties based on 
                                                                                                         
liability corporations, and partnerships must also comply. Bank accounts and financial securities 
must be reported, as well as other financial accounts, such as shares of insurance proceeds, mutual 
funds, and annuities with a cash value. The IRS says that an FBAR must be filed for “tangible assets 
such as real estate or art; and intangible assets such as patents or stock or other interests in a U.S. or 
foreign business.” FAQ, supra note 1, at 35. Any account held in a foreign bank is a foreign account, 
and must be reported. A bank is considered foreign for this purpose if the funds are actually kept in a 
foreign country, regardless of where the bank’s headquarters are located. Thus, if funds are kept in a 
bank in foreign county, which has headquarters in the U.S., the bank is considered foreign. The 
penalty for an FBAR violation can be significant. It is important to first note that the IRS does not 
have to impose any penalties on a violation; rather, the IRS can issue a warning letter. The IRS will 
make that decision when “the facts and circumstances” do not justify a penalty. See Id. at 5. In these 
cases, a FBAR warning letter (I.R.M. § 4.26.17) is issued.     
62 I.R.M. § 4.26.14.4 (2008). 
63 This may be an understatement for the variable related to the number of individual accounts.  
A taxpayer who fails to file FBARs related to ten individual accounts, each worth $1,000,000, is 
liable for penalties commensurate to  $1,000,000. However, a taxpayer who fails to file an FBAR for 
an individual account of $10,000,000 is liable for penalties commensurate to $100,000. The 
distinction is made to reflect the fact that an FBAR must be filed for each account, and thus the first 
taxpayer actually incurred ten separate violations, whereas the second taxpayer incurred only one. 
However, in this case, the IRS fails to adhere to principles of horizontal equity. There is a need to 
address this concern. 
64 Williams, supra note 8. 
65 See United States v. McBride, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (D. Utah 2012). 
66 I.R.M. § 4.26.16.4.3 (2008). 
67 It is important to note that the IRS will generally pursue mitigation when possible. The 
purpose of the FBAR penalties is not to enforce punitive damages but to ensure compliance. 
Therefore, if IRS agents feel that a warning letter will, “promote compliance,” and, “achieve the 
desired result of improving compliance in the future,” the IRS Manual instructs agents to only offer 
the letter.  I.R.M. § 4.26.16.4.7 (2008). 
68 I.R.M., supra note 62, at 4.26.14.4. 
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account size.69 See Table 2 for a graphical explanation of the nonwillful 
penalty mitigation. 
 
Table 2. Nonwillful Penalties Per Taxpayer Per Year 
Penalty Level Penalty Guideline Penalty 
Level 1 
If the aggregate balance 
for all accounts in violation 
does not exceed $50,000, a 
Level 1 penalty applies. 
$500 for each 
violation, not to 
exceed $5,000 for all 
violations. 
Level 2 
If a Level 1 penalty does 
not apply, and if the balance 
of an account to which the 
violations relate does not 
exceed $250,000, a Level 2 
penalty applies. 
$5,000 for each 
Level 2 violation, not 
to exceed 10% of the 
balance in each Level 
2 accounts. 
Level 3 
If a Level 1 penalty does 
not apply, and if the balance 
of an account to which the 
violations relate exceeds 
$250,000, a Level 3 penalty 
applies. 
$10,000 for each 
Level 3 violation. 
 
The penalty for a willful violation is harsher. The IRS can hold any 
taxpayer liable for at least $100,000 per account per year, or 50% of the 
value of each account per year.70 Once again, the IRS offers a penalty 
mitigation guideline. See Table 3 below for a graphical view. 
  
                                                
69 Mitigation is not available in all circumstances. The IRS agents are generally encouraged to 
offer mitigation to both willful and nonwillful violators when four conditions are met: (1) the 
taxpayer has no history of past FBAR penalty assessments, (2) no money passing through the foreign 
accounts in question is associated with an illegal source or used to further a criminal purpose, (3) the 
taxpayer cooperated through the FBAR investigation, and (4) the IRS did not pursue a claim for civil 
fraud for any year in question. I.R.M. § 4.26.16.4.5.6 (2008). 
70 I.R.M. § 4.26.16.4.5 (2008). 
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Table 3. Willful Penalties Per Taxpayer Per Year 
Penalty Level Penalty Guideline Penalty 
Level 1 
If the aggregate balance 
for all accounts to which the 
violations relate did not 
exceed $50,000, a Level 1 
penalty applies. 
A minimum of 
$1,000 per violation or 
5% of the balance of 
each account. 
Level 2 
If a Level 1 penalty does 
not apply, and if the balance 
an account to which the 
violations relate does not 
exceed $250,000, a Level 2 
penalty applies. 
A minimum of 
$5,000 per Level 2 
violation or 10% of the 
balance for each Level 
2 account. 
Level 3 
If the balance of an 
account to which the 
violations relate exceeds 
$250,000, but is less than 
$1,000,000, a Level 3 
penalty applies. 
A minimum of 10% 
of the balance of each 
Level 3 account or 
50% of the closing 
balance of each Level 
3 account as of the last 
day for filing the 
FBAR. 
Level 4 
 
If the balance of an 
account to which the 
violations relate exceeds 
$1,000,000, the Level 4 
penalty applies. 
A minimum of 
$100,000 per Level 4 
violation or 50% of the 
closing balance of each 
Level 4 account as of 
the last day for filing 
the FBAR. 
 
Consider how the IRS would have calculated Mr. Full’s and Ms. 
Bar’s expected FBAR penalties. If either taxpayer nonwillingly violated 
the FBAR reporting requirement each would face an FBAR penalty of 
$29,500 per year for six years.71 However, if either taxpayer was willful, 
each would face an FBAR penalty of $6,272,500 each year for six 
years.72 For Ms. Bar, there is an expected penalty of $2,015,850 
($1,853,400 from the 5% of being willful, and an expected $162,450 
from the 95% of being nonwillful).73 For Mr. Full, there is an expected 
penalty of $18,619,500 ($18,534,000 from the 50% chance of being 
willful and an expected $85,500 from the 50% chance of being 
                                                
71 The two smaller accounts would be level two violations, and the taxpayers will be liable for 
$9,500 ($5,000 + $4,500). The two larger accounts would be level three violations, totaling $20,000 
($10,000 each). 
72 The two smallest amounts will be considered Level 2 violations, totaling $10,000 of liability 
($5,000 each). The next two higher accounts would be Level 3, and 4 violations, totaling liability of 
$6,262,500 ($162,500 + $6,100,000). 
73 See I.R.M., supra note 61, at 4.26.14.4. 
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nonwillful).74 Even though both taxpayers have identical accounts, their 
expected FBAR penalties would vary significantly depending on their 
level of willfulness.  
Given the significant difference between a willful penalty and a 
nonwillful penalty, it is vital for taxpayers to clearly understand the 
distinction between “willful” and “non-willful.” Remarkably, prior to 
July 20, 2012, no case in a federal appellate court had defined civil 
willfulness in an FBAR case.75 Instead, the IRS instructed taxpayers to 
rely on the criminal definition of willfulness when dealing with civil 
FBAR matters.76 The IRS argued that the adoption of the criminal 
definition was appropriate because both statutes use the word “willful” in 
similar contexts.77 See United States v. Sturman.78 
The premier case interpreting willfulness is Cheek v. United States.79 
In Cheek, an individual, after attending a series tax seminars, withheld 
taxes because he believed that the income tax system was 
unconstitutional.80 Mr. Cheek claimed that his genuine belief that taxes 
are unconstitutional indicated that he did not behave “willfully.”81 The 
Court defined willfulness as a “voluntary, intentional violation of a 
known legal duty.”82 The definition requires proof that (1) the law 
imposed a duty on the defendant, (2) the taxpayer knew of the duty, and 
(3) the taxpayer voluntarily and intentionally violated the duty.83 
Therefore, the Court found that Mr. Cheek acted willfully because he 
was aware of the duty to pay taxes and intentionally violated that duty; 
his belief that a duty is unconstitutional does not overturn the knowledge 
of it.84 
The Supreme Court further refined its interpretation of willfulness in 
Ratzlaf v. United States85 whereby the Court considered the concept of 
willfulness in a provision of the Bank Secrecy Act.86 Although Ratzlaf 
                                                
74 See United States v. McBride, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (D. Utah 2012). 
75 IRS Chief. Couns. Mem. 200603026 (Sept. 1, 2005). 
76 “Both section 5321(a)(5), providing for a civil penalty, and section 5322(a), providing for 
criminal penalties, contain similar ‘willfulness’ requirements…. The same word, willful, is used in 
both of these sections. Statutory construction rules suggest that the same word used in related 
sections have the same definition.” Id. 
77 Id. 
78 The definitive case that applies here, and defines the criminal willfulness standard in an 
FBAR concept is United States v. Sturman, 951 F.2d 1466 (6th Cir. 1991). The taxpayers formed 
over 150 companies, five of which were located in a foreign country. Id. In addition to evidence of 
deceit, the taxpayer admitted to being aware of the Schedule B requirement. Id. The court cited 
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) in that the willfulness standard was a, “voluntary, 
intentional violation of a known legal duty.” Id. The corporations were created to conceal income, 
and therefore, the taxpayer did not report the corporations on his FBAR. Id. The Court found that 
“evidence of acts to conceal income and financial information” along with the taxpayers’ failure to 
pursue the reporting requirements as Schedule B suggests. Id. 
79 498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 The case would have been different if Mr. Cheek’s failure to file was a result of the 
complexity of the law. Id. 
85 Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994). 
86 This is the same act as the FBAR. 
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admitted to willfully committing a physical act that violated the Bank 
Secrecy Act, he denied that his actions were “willful,” because he did not 
know that the physical action would violate the law.87 The Court agreed 
with his argument, and found that to convict “willfully,” the taxpayer had 
to violate a known law with the intent to violate that law.88 Thus, the 
term willful, “consistently has been read by the Courts of Appeals to 
require both knowledge of the reporting requirement and a specific intent 
to commit the crime.”89 Additionally, the Court determined that 
circumstantial evidence may be enough.90 
Courts have also relied on the concept of “recklessness.” In Safeco 
Insurance Co. of America v. Burr91 the Court held, regarding 
recklessness, that, “where willfulness is a statutory condition of civil 
liability, it is generally taken to cover not only violations of a standard 
made knowingly, but also recklessly.”92 It determined that “willfully” 
was a, “word of many meanings whose construction is often dependent 
on the context of which it appears.”93 Therefore, the difference between 
willful, wanton and reckless is meaningless.94 The case culminated with 
the following: “at some point…a repeated failure to comply with known 
regulations can move a defendant’s conduct from inadvertence neglect 
into reckless or deliberate disregard, and thus willfulness.”95 
The IRS has also equated willful blindness with willfulness. The IRS 
manual explains that, “willfulness may be attributed to a person who has 
made a conscious effort to avoid learning about the FBAR reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements.96 The IRS has provided an example of 
willful blindness to the FBAR requirement: “A taxpayer admits 
knowledge of and fails to answer a question concerning signature 
authority at foreign banks in Schedule B of his income tax returns. A 
failure to follow up by looking at the FBAR instructions to see if you 
have to file would provide some evidence of willful blindness.”97 
The IRS argues that signing a return constitutes willful evasion if the 
taxpayer fails to file a required FBAR. There are two bases for this 
argument. First, if the taxpayer reviewed the required instructions as part 
of question 7a, she had knowledge of the requirement and, thus, the 
                                                
87 Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 141. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 In United States v. Bilbrey, 142 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 1998) the court determined that signing a 
Form 1040 was not enough for a willful conviction, but additional circumstantial evidence may be. 
The taxpayer did not report all of her income on her tax returns, but did sign them. The court focused 
not only on the signature but on the fact that the taxpayer played an active role in the business, and 
had knowledge of the undisclosed income and revenue. There was additional evidence that she 
should have known that her tax returns did not report all the income, as she was living off the 
undisclosed income. 
91 America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Am. Arms Int'l v. Herbert, 563 F.3d 78, 85 (4th Cir. 2009). The IRS manual does not 
endorse this method. Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
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failure was willful. Second, if the taxpayer did not review the 
instructions required as part of question 7a, the taxpayer actively chose 
not to become aware of the law and was therefore willfully blind. Thus, 
as long as the taxpayer signed her return, she was (or should have been) 
aware of the FBAR requirement and the violation was willful. Before 
July 20, 2012, courts rejected this as prima facie evidence.98 
In Lurding v. United States,99 the court found that although signing a 
return makes the document, “his own,” it does not give rise to enough 
knowledge, without other circumstances, to claim that the taxpayer 
willfully violated. Also, in United States v. Mohney,100 the court said, 
“willfulness requires proof of specific intent to do something that the law 
forbids; more than a showing of careless disregard for the trusty is 
required.”101 Therefore, according to Mohney, a taxpayer’s signature on a 
return does not in itself prove his knowledge, but knowledge can be 
inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances. Examples of such 
facts and circumstances are knowledge of business revenues, active role 
in operations, hiring of an accounting firm and payment of taxes.102 
On July 20, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
released the first judicial opinion outside of the U.S. Tax Court which 
specifically adjudicated the civil willfulness standard in an FBAR 
context.103 Prior to this decision, tax practitioners could not rely any 
upper level court for guidance as to the definition of willfulness in an 
FBAR context. In United States v. Williams, Mr. Williams opened two 
bank accounts located in Switzerland, which contained over $7,000,000 
in principal and created over $800,000 in income through 2000. During 
that time, Mr. Williams failed to report both the income earned from this 
account (as required in 26 USC § 61) and the presence of this account on 
his FBAR (as required in 26 USC § 5314). Form 1040, question 7a 
asked: “At any time during 2000, did you have an interest in or a 
signature or other authority over a financial account in a foreign country, 
such as a bank account, securities account, or other financial account? 
See instructions for exceptions and filing requirements for Form TD F 
90-22.1.”104 
Mr. Williams checked “No” for this answer, and did not review the 
instructions or send in an FBAR. After the IRS became aware of Mr. 
Williams’ violations, it began a criminal investigation into his actions.105 
Mr. Williams pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud the IRS and criminal 
tax evasion. He admitted to knowing about the obligation to file an 
FBAR since 1993.106 The IRS subsequently assessed a civil penalty of 
                                                
98 See United States v. Bilbrey, 142 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Sturman, 951 
F.2d 1466, 1474 (6th Cir. 1991). 
99 Lurding v. United States, 179 F.2d 419 (6th Cir. 1950). 
100 United States v. Mohney, 949 F.2d 1397 (6th Cir. 1991). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 United States v. Williams, 489 F. App’x 655 (2012). 
104 I.R.M., supra note 62, at 4.26.16.1. 
105 Williams, 489 F. App’x at 657 n.2. 
106 Id. 
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$200,000 against Mr. Williams for failure to file his 2000 FBAR.107 The 
district court ruled that the IRS failed to establish that Mr. Williams 
willfully violated the law. The IRS appealed that decision to the Fourth 
Circuit.108 
On appeal, both parties agreed that a violation occurred; the question 
before the court was whether the violation occurred willfully. The court 
began its analysis with a reminder that Mr. Williams signed his 2000 tax 
return under a penalty of perjury, and that, “a taxpayer who signs a tax 
return will not be heard to claim innocence for not having actually read 
the return, as he or she is charged with constructive knowledge of its 
contents.”109 The court concluded that because Mr. Williams signed his 
return he knew the contents of his return, specifically line 7a.110 
Mr. Williams, however, claimed to have never read line 7a, or the 
instructions for the FBAR.111 The court held that Mr. Williams engaged 
in a, “conscious effort to avoid learning about reporting requirements,” 
or willful blindness.112 Additionally, the court viewed his admission in 
the criminal case that he was aware of the requirement as further 
evidence of his willful behavior. The court, therefore, overruled the 
district court and found Mr. Williams guilty for willfully failing to file an 
FBAR.113 
Although decided by the Fourth Circuit Court, the case was 
unpublished, and thus, not binding on any subsequent court.114 This gives 
other courts the latitude to make their own decisions, and potentially 
diverge from the Williams case. Practitioners, however, must now 
consider the possibility that other courts will follow Williams and view 
checking “No” on question 7a as an important factor. 
Substantively, the Williams case pursued a different method for 
viewing the civil willfulness standard than the lower courts.115 The court 
considered the fact that Mr. Williams signed his Form 1040 and said 
“No” for question 7a, the main factor in finding him liable, and only 
minimally discussed the circumstantial evidence against him. This 
contrasts with the previous approach taken by lower courts to analyze the 
facts before rendering a decision on willfulness. Practitioners must now 
be more careful when advising clients. There is now a possibility that 
courts will be more likely to find willfulness in the case of a box checked 
“No.” While the Fourth Circuit stopped short of declaring a strict liability 
                                                
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Williams, 489 F. App’x. at 659 (citing Greer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 595 
F.3d 338, 347 n.4 (2010)). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Not only is Williams significant because it used a different method of viewing the issue, but 
also because it took place at a higher court. 
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standard, many observers feel such a standard will virtually be applied 
going forward.116 
The Williams ruling will make the IRS more likely to find taxpayers 
willful, given many taxpayers check “No” on question 7a and do not file 
an FBAR. This increased liability affects nearly half of taxpayers. In a 
study conducted in July 2010, attorneys were questioned about question 
7a.117 The survey estimated that out of those cases that enter the OVDP, 
slightly less than half of the returns checked “No.”118 Most often, tax 
practitioners noted, the error was caused either by return preparation 
software or a simple oversight.119 In spite of the reason for checking 
“No,” the new Williams standard turns the odds against taxpayers in a 
willfulness determination. 
 
B. Why a Changing Willfulness Standard Affects the OVDP 
 
The potential effect of this stringent civil willfulness standard on 
those who checked “No” will be significant to the OVDP in two ways. 
First, Williams may make it more beneficial for a taxpayer to join the 
OVDP because under Williams the expected tax liability of avoiding the 
OVDP is increased. Second, if the expected FBAR penalty outside the 
Program increases, it will make entry to the OVDP, and taking the 27.5% 
offshore penalty, more attractive. 
Consider how this change would affect Mr. Full and Ms. Bar. For Ms. 
Bar, we estimated that there was an initial probability of 5% that the IRS 
would find her willful. However, if we factor in the potential of 
Williams, it is reasonable to estimate that the probability the IRS will 
find the taxpayer willful may rise to 20%. Thus, we can predict that her 
expected FBAR penalty outside of the OVDP will be $7,550,400, an 
increase of about 275%.120 Mr. Full will see a relatively lower impact 
based on Williams. Initially, he had a projected 50% chance of being 
found willful. Considering Williams, we can be more confident that the 
IRS will find willfulness and estimate his probability at 75%. Thus, his 
expected FBAR penalty outside the OVDP is $27,843,750, 121 an increase 
of almost 50%.  
Williams will also change the estimated payment for entering the 
OVDP. Although taxpayers may still opt out of the OVDP and accept the 
normal FBAR penalty, Williams increases the expected FBAR penalty 
obtained through opting out. After Williams, it is likely that the expected 
                                                
116 Jeremiah Coder, FBAR Penalty Case Reversal Raises Questions About Civil Willfulness 
Standard, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 24, 2012, available at 2012 TNT 142-2. 
117 Daniel L. Gottfried, Proving Willfulness in FBARS – Checking ‘No’ Ain’t Apropos, TAX 
NOTES TODAY, Sept. 2010, available at 2010 TNT 188-14. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 $7,550,400 (expected penalty) = willful (0.20 × $37,068,000) + nonwillful (0.80 × 
$171,000). 
121 $27,843,750 (expected penalty) = willful (0.75 × $37,068,000) + nonwillful (0.25 × 
$171,000). 
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liability of the FBAR penalty will be higher than the offshore penalty, 
thus making the opt out less beneficial. The taxpayer who would have 
previously opted out may find that accepting the offshore penalty is the 
best option. This makes the OVDP more appealing, as the offshore 
penalty provides a more beneficial framework.   
Consider how these changes affect our two taxpayers’ decision to 
enter OVDP. If Ms. Bar avoids the OVDP, her expected liability rises to 
$7,550,400, and she is therefore more likely to enter. By entering the 
OVDP, she will have to pay the offshore penalty of $3,422,375, as opting 
out is not optimal. However, she will now have a lower penalty by 
entering the OVDP than if the IRS caught her outside the OVDP. In 
comparison, Ms. Bar previously would have paid the same penalty inside 
the OVDP (by opting out) as she would outside. Her decision matrix is 
reduced to whether paying $3,422,374, plus being compliant and 
knowing liability (rather than being subject to an audit), is better than the 
possibility of never getting caught (which would cost $7,550,400). 
Although we cannot be sure what she will do, she has more incentive to 
enter the OVDP. 
If Mr. Full stays outside the OVDP, he will have an expected FBAR 
penalty of $27,843,750. However, by entering the OVDP, he will only 
pay the offshore penalty of $3,422,375. Thus, after Williams, Mr. Full 
will pay $24,471,375 less by entering the OVDP than if caught by the 
IRS. By comparison, without the Williams decision, Mr. Full would have 
had to pay $18,619,500 if caught by the IRS and only $3,422,375 if he 
entered the OVDP. Like Ms. Bar, his decision matrix is reduced to 
whether paying $3,422,375, plus being compliant and knowing liability 
(rather than being subject to an audit), is better than the possibility of 
never getting caught (which would cost $27,843,750). He is clearly more 
incentivized to enter the OVDP. 
 
Table 4. Decision Matrix After Williams for Ms. Bar and Mr. Full 
 Enter the OVDP Avoid the OVDP and Risk Audit 
Ms. Bar 
(20% Willful; 
80% Nonwillful) 
Guaranteed Penalty of 
$3,422,375; Enter 
Compliance 
Expected Penalty of 
$7,550,400 if Examined;  
Potential to Avoid 
Penalty If No Audit 
Mr. Full 
(70% Willful; 
30% Nonwillful) 
Guaranteed Penalty of 
$3,442,375; Enter 
Compliance; Avoid 
Criminal Prosecution; 
Certainty of Penalty 
Liability  
Expected Penalty of 
$27,843,750 if Examined; 
Potential to Avoid 
Penalty If No Audit 
 
From an efficiency perspective, the Williams case will make Mr. Full 
and taxpayers like him more inclined to enter into the OVDP. If Mr. Full 
was previously on the fence about entering the OVDP, the Williams case 
may motivate him to enter. It is unclear whether the Williams case will 
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make Ms. Bar and taxpayers like her more inclined to enter the OVDP. 
For the taxpayer like Ms. Bar, the cost of entering the OVDP has 
significantly increased. With the opt out potentially not as important, she 
will likely face the offshore penalty if she enters the OVDP. However, 
the cost of staying outside the OVDP has also increased dramatically. In 
Ms. Bar’s situation, it makes slightly more sense quantitatively for her to 
enter the OVDP. However, Ms. Bar may now be more willing to sit out 
and hope that the IRS will not audit her, considering the penalty levels 
are higher. 
Nina Olson, the National Taxpayer Advocate, addressed this problem 
by writing that, “[i]ncreasing the danger that taxpayers who have 
reasonably and in good faith tried to comply will nonetheless be 
penalized may achieve an opposite result: that the IRS or the tax rules 
will be perceived as unfair, and voluntary compliance will suffer.”122  
From an equity perspective, the OVDP becomes more flawed after 
Williams. Before the Williams case, the IRS treated Mr. Full and Ms. Bar 
differently, reflecting the clear difference in their levels of willfulness, 
despite having the same amount in accounts overseas. If Mr. Full entered 
the OVDP, he would pay the 27.5% offshore penalty of $3,442,375, 
whereas if Ms. Bar entered the OVDP she would opt out and have an 
expected payment of only $2,180,225. Ms. Bar would have paid 
$1,200,000 less. After Williams, however, either taxpayer would be 
better off paying the 27.5% offshore penalty of $3,442,375 under the 
OVDP. 
Although Williams will make some taxpayers (those for whom the opt 
out is not optimal) more likely to enter, it causes equity problems for 
those who would have benefitted from the opt out under a gentler 
willfulness standard. It is unjust to treat Mr. Full and Ms. Bar in the same 
manner by asking each to pay the same 27.5% penalty. Equity was not a 
concern pre-Williams because of the opt out procedure. However, 
policymakers need a new solution if the current opt out option will not 
provide equitable solutions to taxpayers like Ms. Bar. 
 
IV. SUGGESTED NEW APPROACH TO THE OVDP 
 
The future success of the OVDP is in question because of the equity 
problems created by Williams. Policymakers must devise a solution to 
address that problem, but also to preserve the success the IRS has had 
encouraging taxpayers to disclose foreign taxes while keeping 
administrative costs low. Policymakers must create a solution that holds 
taxpayers liable for different penalties based on culpability. 
An excellent starting point for a potential solution is a program 
described by Nina Olson, the National Taxpayer Advocate. In a July 
2012 report, prior to Williams, Ms. Olson proposed a tri-level OVDP to 
further promote equity. Given that Williams only exacerbated any 
previous equity problem, this solution is more relevant today than ever 
                                                
122 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE, 2011 ANN. REP. at 198.  
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before. Under Ms. Olson’s program the IRS must establish “broad but 
clearly defined categories for these taxpayers, based on the level of 
noncompliance.”123 The three suggested categories are: 
 
1. Full Relief from FBAR and Information Reporting Penalties 
a. Taxpayers who have properly reported taxable income 
but did not file FBARs; and 
b. Taxpayers who did not properly report all taxable 
income, but the tax liability is below a threshold amount. 
2. Taxpayers Who Have Reasonable Cause and Acted Nonwillfully 
a. Nonresident United States taxpayers who do not qualify 
for category 1 because they did not file tax returns and owe 
more in tax than the threshold amount; and 
b. Violators that the IRS cannot prove acted willfully. 
3. Taxpayers Not Included in Category 1 or 2 
a. All other taxpayers124 
 
Under the first prong of Ms. Olson’s Program there are two 
circumstances which allow the disclosing taxpayer to have full relief 
from FBAR penalties. First, taxpayers who have been properly reporting 
income, but did not file an FBAR are immune from penalties.125 Second, 
taxpayers whose taxable liability falls under a threshold amount will also 
not be penalized. There is no de minimus provision in the current OVDP. 
The second prong enforces a nonwillful FBAR penalty for taxpayers 
whom the IRS cannot prove acted willfully. Finally, the IRS will reserve 
the third prong for taxpayers who do not fall into the previous two 
categories, presumably willful violators who will be required to pay the 
offshore penalty. 
The strength of Ms. Olson’s program is that it forces taxpayers to opt 
out and choose a category. This will once again restore equity, as the IRS 
treats individual taxpayers differently. This is more beneficial than the 
current OVDP, because presently, when a taxpayer opts out and cannot 
prove nonwillfulness, the IRS charges a high FBAR penalty. However, 
in Ms. Olson’s program, if the taxpayer does not fit, the second prong 
fails; presumably the taxpayer would simply pay the offshore penalty 
under the third prong. Given that for many taxpayers the offshore penalty 
is substantially lower than the willful FBAR penalty, this will reduce the 
expected liability for most nonwillful taxpayers. The OVDP, however, is 
more difficult to administer. Almost every taxpayer would find it 
beneficial to argue for nonwillfulness. The only cost for a taxpayer who 
chooses to make this argument is additional attorney’s fees. 
This paper proposes tweaking Ms. Olson’s program to streamline the 
administrative concerns. The first prong, also assessing no liability, 
should be modified to include taxpayers who failed to file an FBAR but 
                                                
123 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE, 2013 FISCAL ANNUAL OBJECTIVES. 
124 Id.  
125 There is a similar provision in the IRS’s FAQ. See FAQ, supra note 1, at 17. 
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have been reporting income, and taxpayers owing a back tax liability of 
less than $1,500, before interest and penalties. The de minimus provision 
would greatly reduce the administrative burden of the IRS without giving 
up substantial revenue. It also might induce more disclosure, which is the 
most important goal of the OVDP. 
The modified program reserves the second prong for taxpayers taking 
the nonwillful penalty. Taxpayers either take the nonwillful penalty 
because the IRS could not prove that they acted willfully, or they have an 
aggregate balance under $100,000. The IRS would have the right to 
bring any taxpayer claiming they belong in the second prong to a tribunal 
to prove willfulness. If the IRS proves willfulness, it would subject the 
taxpayer to the third prong, and its 27.5% offshore penalty. The 
aggregate balance provision is as a de minimus provision, estopping the 
IRS from challenging relatively small accounts. When the IRS is 
determining the nonwillful penalty, it should assume all individual 
accounts were aggregated as one, as not to assess FBAR penalties for 
each individual account. 
The third prong is for all other taxpayers, presumably those who 
clearly acted willfully. The IRS would assess the offshore penalty of 
27.5%. Taxpayers choosing the third prong, however, would only be 
penalized 20% rather than being rerouted from the second prong. In 
short, Ms. Olsen’s modified proposal is: 
 
1. Full Relief from FBAR and Information Reporting Penalties 
a. Taxpayers who Failed to File an FBAR but Either 
Properly Reported the Income; or 
b. Taxpayers who Owe Less than $1,500 of Tax Liability 
Before Interest and Penalties 
2. Nonwillful Penalty Structure 
a. All Taxpayers with an Aggregate Account Balance 
Under $100,000; or  
b. Taxpayers for whom the IRS Cannot Prove Willfulness 
3. Offshore Penalty Structure 
a. All Other Taxpayers 
 
This penalty structure addresses the administrative concerns of Ms. 
Olson’s proposal. By giving taxpayers a 7.5% penalty reduction for 
initially entering the third prong, taxpayers who are clearly willful would 
be incentivized to forego the argument. The IRS would also have little 
incentive to attempt to prove the willfulness of taxpayers who are clearly 
nonwillful. This structure promotes equity while reducing administrative 
waste.   
Consider how Ms. Bar’s and Mr. Full’s decision changes under this 
new Program. 
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Table 5. Decision Matrix After New Solution for Ms. Bar and Mr. Full 
 Enter the OVDP Avoid the OVDP and Risk Audit 
Ms. Bar 
(20% Willful; 
80% Nonwillful) 
Expected Penalty of 
$732,475; Enter 
Compliance; Certainty of 
Penalty Liability 
Expected Penalty of 
$7,550,400;  
Potential to Avoid 
Penalty If Not Audit 
Mr. Full 
(70% Willful; 
30% Nonwillful) 
Expected Penalty of 
$2,489,000 (Accept 20% 
Penalty); Enter 
Compliance; Avoid 
Criminal Prosecution; 
Certainty of Penalty 
Liability  
Expected Penalty of 
$27,843,750 if Examined; 
Potential to Avoid 
Penalty If No Audit 
 
For Ms. Bar, the expected penalty of avoiding the OVDP remains at 
$7,550,400. The expected penalty, however, of entering the OVDP is 
reduced to $732,475. For Mr. Full, the expected penalty of avoiding the 
OVDP remains at $27,843,750. The expected penalty, however, of 
entering the OVDP is $2,489,000; higher than Ms. Bar’s penalty but still 
lower than the penalty assessed under the current OVDP. 
Under the modified OVDP, Ms. Bar and Mr. Full are incentivized to 
disclose. Ms. Bar’s expected tax liability inside the OVDP is over ten 
times lower than her expected penalty if caught outside of the Program. 
Her expected penalty inside the OVDP falls from $3,422,375 to 
$732,475. That provides a remarkably better incentive for her to disclose 
under the modified solution. Furthermore, her likelihood of disclosure is 
increased by the certainty and utility of compliance. Mr. Full’s expected 
tax liability inside the OVDP is more than nine times lower than his 
expected penalty if caught outside of the OVDP. His expected penalty 
inside the OVDP would fall from $3,422,375 to $2,489,000. This lower 
penalty gives him a marginally better reason to disclose under the 
modified OVDP. Although it is impossible to say whether either 
taxpayer would disclose, the more beneficial penalty framework would 
certainly make them more likely to disclose.  
The modified OVDP not only improves disclosure incentives, but 
increases equity as well. Before this solution, both Mr. Full and Ms. Bar 
were best served paying the same offshore penalty under the OVDP. 
Given the new structure, Ms. Bar would likely argue that she is 
nonwillful, while Mr. Full would likely accept the third prong. Both 
taxpayers pay different expected tax liabilities, thus restoring the OVDP 
equity concerns caused by Williams.     
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Given the popularity and relative success of the OVDP over the last 
four years, the IRS cannot afford a decline in its effectiveness. As this 
paper explained, the OVDP has been successful according to its goals, 
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and has given taxpayers a variety of reasons to disclose. Given the 
potentially powerful changes of the Williams case, however, the 
continued success of the OVDP is uncertain. Although it seems that there 
will still be incentives for taxpayers (especially willful taxpayers) to 
enter the OVDP, there are equity problems with the OVDP created by 
Williams. 
This paper proposes a solution to ensure the OVDP’s success by 
preserving administrative resources, and encouraging taxpayers to enter, 
while fixing equity concerns. Although this modified OVDP may 
sacrifice some revenue, the overall result will be a net gain from 
additional disclosure, thus assisting the IRS in future prosecutions. 
 
